Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Posthumous notes', 'fragments/reports' and 'Naming and Necessity notes and addenda'

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42 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
1502 Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
449 Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides]
448 No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides]
447 Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
445 The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides]
1503 There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
21820 Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
452 All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
17000 We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
1504 Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
17044 A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
16999 A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
444 The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
17058 What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
4970 What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
450 Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17059 Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
17003 Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
451 Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
21971 Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
1506 Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
3058 Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
4969 I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
4956 A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
555 People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides]
226 The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides]
5081 There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides]
1509 The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius]
20900 Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
1505 Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides]
453 Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
1792 He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
5115 It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
13217 The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
22918 What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
1794 He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
1791 He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]